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 Parliamentary Engagement with the 
Charter: Rethinking the Idea of 
Legislative Rights Review 
Janet L. Hiebert 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canada has contributed an important idea to constitutional thought 
about how to conceive of legislative responsibilities under a bill of 
rights.1 This idea is the concept of legislative rights review, which 
originated in the Canadian Bill of Rights,2 was adapted for the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 and has been emulated and altered in 
several other Westminster-based parliamentary systems that have 
recently adopted statutory bills of rights.4 These include New Zealand 
                                                                                                             
 Queen’s University. 
1 The borrowing and adaptation of this idea elsewhere is discussed by the author in: “New 
Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting 
Rights?” (2004) 82:7 Tex. L. Rev. 1963; “Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of 
Legislative Rights Review” (2005) 35 Brit. J. Poli. Sci. 235 [hereinafter “Hiebert, ‘Interpreting a Bill 
of Rights’”]; “Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures” (2005) 68:4 Mod. L. Rev. 676; 
“Constitutional Experimentation: Rethinking How a Bill of Rights Functions”, in Rosalind Dixon & 
Tom Ginsberg, eds., Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2011), at 298-320. 
2 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4 In Canada, s. 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2 requires the Minis-
ter of Justice in Canada (who also serves as Attorney General) to alert Parliament where bills are 
inconsistent with the Charter. Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 No. 109 requires 
that the Attorney General advise Parliament when bills are not consistent with its provisions. In the 
United Kingdom, s. 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 requires the sponsoring 
minister of a bill to report either that it is compatible with Convention rights or that he or she is 
unable to make a report of compatibility. This report must be made to both houses of Parliament 
(Canada requires a report only to the House of Commons while New Zealand is a unicameral 
system). What this means in the U.K. is that when a bill passes from one house to the other, a second 
statement will be required, and it must take into account earlier amendments made. The respective 
statements will be made by whichever minister has been given responsibility in the particular house. 
In the Australian Capital Territory, s. 37(1) and (2) of the Human Rights Act 2004 oblige the 
Attorney General to make a compatibility statement about every bill presented to the Assembly by a 
minister. In Victoria, s. 28(2) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006 No. 43 
requires that a member of Parliament who introduces a bill into a House of Parliament must “cause” 
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(1990),5 the United Kingdom (1998),6 the Australian Capital Territory 
(2004),7 and the Australian state of Victoria (2006).8 The idea behind 
legislative rights review is that rights should be a core consideration 
when assessing the merits of legislative objectives and how best to 
achieve these in the process of developing legislation, as well as during 
parliamentary scrutiny when deciding if amendments are warranted. 
This paper argues that although the practice of legislative rights re-
view in Canada has not materialized here as intended, Canada should 
revisit the benefits of this concept, and it discusses reforms to revitalize 
legislative rights review that are influenced by the United Kingdom’s 
adaptation of this idea. 
II. ORIGINS OF LEGISLATIVE RIGHTS REVIEW 
The 1960 statutory Canadian Bill of Rights was criticized for its fail-
ure to establish a clear and coherent judicial mandate. Nevertheless, it 
envisaged the laudable objective of trying to ensure that public and 
political officials confront the implication of legislation in terms of 
rights, as a condition for responsible political decision-making. 
John Diefenbaker, whose government introduced the Canadian Bill 
of Rights, differed from conventional views about the role and function 
of a bill of rights. Rather than relying exclusively on judicial review, he 
thought it possible and desirable to improve Parliament’s capacity to 
function as a custodian of civil liberties.9 To that end, the Bill of Rights 
created a new statutory reporting requirement in section 3 that the 
Minster of Justice alert Parliament if introducing legislation that was 
inconsistent with rights.10 The very requirement of having to make this 
                                                                                                             
a statement of compatibility to be prepared and presented before the House of Parliament into which 
the bill is introduced before his or her second reading speech on the bill. 
5 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 No. 109. 
6 Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42. 
7 Human Rights Act, 2004 (Australian Capital Territory). 
8 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006 No. 43 (Victoria). 
9 Christopher MacLennan, Toward the Charter (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2003), at 148. 
10 Section 3 of the Canadian Bill of Rights requires: 
... the Minister of Justice shall, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed 
by the Governor in Council, examine every regulation transmitted to the Clerk of the 
Privy Council for registration pursuant to the Statutory Instruments Act and every Bill 
introduced in or presented to the House of Commons by a Minister of the Crown, in order 
to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and 
provisions of this Part and he shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Com-
mons at the first convenient opportunity. 
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kind of report was expected to trigger a new emphasis on rights when 
evaluating proposed legislation, and to create a new rights consciousness 
within the bureaucracy, government and Parliament. 
Rights protection under the Canadian Bill of Rights was expected to 
occur not simply, or even primarily, because of the introduction of rights-
based judicial review. Quite separate from any role that judicial review 
served, rights were expected to be protected through a combination of a 
new practice for bureaucratic assessments of whether proposed legisla-
tion implicated rights adversely, and also because of the political implica-
tions that accrued from a new statutory obligation that the Minister of 
Justice alert Parliament when bills violated rights. This statutory obliga-
tion was expected to discourage cabinet from approving bills that would 
require this report of inconsistency. Former Deputy Minister of Justice 
Elmer Driedger speculated that if cabinet insisted on approving a bill that 
violated rights, the Minister of Justice would likely feel compelled to 
resign rather than risk being put in the position of having to make a 
report to Parliament that the government knowingly was introducing 
legislation inconsistent with rights.11 
Driedger’s confidence that the reporting requirement would precipi-
tate careful evaluation of whether and how policy initiatives implicate 
rights was also influenced by the presence in the Bill of Rights of the 
notwithstanding clause in section 2 (a precursor to section 33 of the 
Charter). This provision requires that if a government is determined to 
introduce legislation that patently violates protected rights, it must 
declare that the legislation will operate notwithstanding the Canadian 
Bill of Rights. Without this declaration, courts are otherwise obliged to 
interpret the legislation in a manner that does not abrogate, abridge or 
infringe the rights or freedoms in the Bill of Rights. From Driedger’s 
perspective, the inevitable criticism that would accompany use of this 
declaration (both in and beyond Parliament) would discourage any such 
use. As he stated, no government “would be so foolish or stupid as to 
submit to Parliament a bill obviously in conflict with the Bill of Rights”. 
This is because opposition parties would have ample grounds to move an 
amendment which, “as a matter of simple politics, the government would 
have to accept”.12 Consequently, from his perspective, any bill that would 
require reliance on the section 2 notwithstanding clause had almost no 
                                                                                                             
11 Elmer A. Driedger, “The Meaning and Effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights: A 
Draftsman’s Viewpoint” (1977) 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 311 [hereinafter “Driedger”]. 
12 Id. 
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chance of becoming law.13 Thus, Driedger believed that the combined 
effects of a political interest in not having to report to Parliament that a 
bill was inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, and a political reluctance to 
rely on the Bill of Rights’ notwithstanding provision, provided ample 
insurance that the government would proactively comply with the Bill of 
Rights. 
This proactive capacity to protect rights was believed possible under 
a Westminster-based political system in a way precluded by the separated 
system in the United States. The reason for this belief was that under a 
parliamentary system the “whole machinery of government” could be 
enlisted in the project of safeguarding rights, a holistic approach consid-
ered possible only where there is a fusion of executive and legislative 
powers. As Driedger opined on the juxtaposition of this particular kind of 
a bill of rights and a Westminster parliamentary system, the idea of 
enlisting all branches of government in the protection of rights repre-
sented the world’s most “comprehensive, powerful and effective” bill of 
rights: 
All future laws are ... purified before they become laws ... This process 
is possible only under a parliamentary system of government, where 
officials are responsible to Ministers, Ministers to the House of 
Commons, and the House of Commons to the electorate. The whole 
machinery of government — apart from the courts — is enlisted by the 
Bill of Rights to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms are 
safeguarded. It cannot be disputed that at this stage the Bill of Rights 
is powerfully effective. This kind of control is not possible with a 
congressional system of government, where there is complete 
separation between the executive and the legislature and where the 
executive cannot control the content of bills submitted to the 
legislature.14 
However, this confidence in legislative rights review under the Canadian 
Bill of Rights was seriously misplaced for three reasons. First, it did not 
anticipate that a direct relationship would arise between the degree to 
which courts interpret rights robustly or grant significant remedies for 
rights violations on the one hand, and the strength of the bureaucratic and 
political incentives to evaluate proposed legislation rigorously from a 
rights perspective, on the other. As it turned out, the Supreme Court’s 
decision not to interpret the Bill of Rights as imposing new norms for 
                                                                                                             
13 Id. 
14 Id., at 316. 
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constraining uses of state power, but as recognition of the rights that 
already existed (R. v. Robertson15), along with the validation of almost all 
federal legislation challenged, provided little incentive for policy and 
political officials to question rigorously the merits of legislative initia-
tives from a rights perspective.16 Second, this optimistic view also did 
not take into consideration that the absence of reports of inconsistency 
would provide Parliament little context or experience for questioning a 
government’s assumptions that legislation complies with rights. Third, 
the idea that legislation could be purified through the adoption of good 
administrative and political practices17 belied a lack of appreciation that 
fundamental disagreements are more likely to arise over questions about 
the scope of rights, the justification of the legislative goal, and the merits 
of judgments about proportionality, than about actual political intentions 
to respect or safeguard rights. 
The statutory reporting requirement has been adapted for the Charter 
in section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act.18 However, this obliga-
tion has not facilitated the kind of intra-institutional scrutiny that the 
original concept intended. Bills are evaluated by government lawyers 
for the executive. However, Parliament has remained relatively insignifi-
cant as a venue for debate about Charter considerations and rarely 
questions the implicit claims of government that bills are consistent with 
the Charter (implicit because of the absence of a report of Charter 
inconsistency). 
                                                                                                             
15 [1963] S.C.J. No. 62, [1963] S.C.R. 651 (S.C.C.). 
16 This interpretation is based on interviews [hereinafter “Interviews”] with several officials 
in the Human Rights Centre at the Department of Justice, which were conducted between 1999 and 
2000 on the basis of anonymity. I also had repeated and candid conversations with John Tait (1994-
1995) and George Thomson (1998-1999), both of whom had earlier served as deputy minister in the 
Department. 
17 Driedger, supra, note 11, at 306. 
18 This requirement is found in section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. J-2, which provides: 
Subject to subsection (2), the Minister shall, in accordance with such regulations as 
may be prescribed by the Governor in Council, examine every regulation transmitted to 
the Clerk of the Privy Council for registration pursuant to the Statutory Instruments Act 
and every Bill introduced in or presented to the House of Commons by a minister of the 
Crown, in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with 
the purposes and provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
Minister shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons at the first con-
venient opportunity. 
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III. CHARTER EVALUATIONS PRIOR TO LEGISLATION  
BEING INTRODUCED TO PARLIAMENT 
Despite the statutory obligation of the Minister of Justice to alert Par-
liament if bills are inconsistent with the Charter, no report of Charter 
inconsistency has ever been made, and it is highly unlikely that reports of 
inconsistency will be made in the future. The Canadian practice of non-
reporting is influenced by the political and legal consequences that would 
accrue from acknowledging that a bill is inconsistent with the Charter. 
The popularity of the Charter makes it difficult for governments to 
concede that they are introducing a bill that is not consistent with the 
Charter. The constitutional authority of courts to declare inconsistent 
legislation invalid also discourages such a report because acknowledging 
incompatibility would make it extremely difficult for any subsequent 
successful defence of the legislation if it were later subject to Charter 
litigation. Unless the Supreme Court takes the concept of judicial 
deference to an entirely new level, it is unlikely to uphold legislation as a 
reasonable limit under section 1 if the Minister of Justice had earlier 
conceded that the legislation was not reasonable. 
However, the lack of reports on Charter inconsistency does not mean 
that bills are introduced to Parliament without any consideration for their 
implications for the Charter. On the contrary, bills are systematically 
assessed by legal officials in the Department of Justice who provide 
ministers with advice about the likelihood that these initiatives could 
result in successful Charter litigation.19 
The nominal purpose of Charter vetting is for the minister to fulfil 
his or her reporting obligation under section 4.1 of the Department of 
Justice Act. The more political purpose of these evaluations is to manage 
the risk associated with passing legislation in a constitutional system 
where courts have strong interpretive and remedial powers. 
IV. RISK AVERSION 
In the early days of the Charter, it was not obvious how the Supreme 
Court would interpret the Charter, and thus it was unclear what the 
consequences would be if legislation was not subject to robust pre-
                                                                                                             
19 James B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter. Legislative and Judicial Activism and Fra-
mers’ Intent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), at 222-57 [hereinafter “Kelly, Governing with the 
Charter”]; Janet L. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002), at 3-19 [hereinafter “Hiebert, Charter Conflicts”]. 
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legislative Charter scrutiny. This uncertainty had a substantial influence 
on how bills were initially evaluated. The sustained period of judicial 
restraint under the Canadian Bill of Rights had conditioned the public 
service to adopt similarly constrained interpretations of rights when 
advising on potential conflicts in the early days of the Charter. However, 
more robust Charter vetting began to occur after several early Supreme 
Court decisions revealed the very real possibility that governments could 
incur serious political, policy and fiscal costs should they lose a Charter 
case.20 These influential decisions were Singh v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) (which set aside Canada’s refugee 
determination process, necessitating very costly changes);21 Schachter v. 
Canada (in which the Court indicated that it was prepared to “read in” 
new meaning to legislation as a remedy for a rights violation);22 and R. v. 
Oakes (establishing what appear to be difficult criteria for justifying 
legislative restrictions on rights).23 
Growing concerns about how legislation would fare before the Su-
preme Court encouraged attempts to reduce the risk of invalidation. In 
1991 then clerk of the Privy Council Paul Tellier wrote to deputy 
ministers to urge that Charter scrutiny be conducted in the early stages of 
the policy process.24 In what became known as the “Tellier Memoran-
dum”, departments were called upon to incorporate Charter analysis in 
the memorandum to cabinet, and the analysis was to “include an assess-
ment of the risk of successful challenge in the courts, the impact of an 
adverse decision, and possible litigation costs”.25 
Two other factors that have led to more robust forms of scrutiny are 
the popularity of the Charter, particularly as contrasted with the relatively 
ineffective and uncelebrated status of the statutory Bill of Rights, and an 
emerging public confidence in the judiciary as the primary interpreter of 
rights, which makes it politically risky for politicians to defend positions 
that seem contrary to judicial views on Charter compatibility, or to 
invoke the notwithstanding clause in the event the Supreme Court sets 
aside inconsistent legislation. Most uses of the notwithstanding clause 
occurred in the early years of the Charter, often in a pre-emptive attempt 
                                                                                                             
20 Interviews, supra, note 16. 
21 [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). 
22 [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.). 
23 [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
24 Kelly, Governing with the Charter, supra, note 19, at 234. 
25 Mary Dawson, “The Impact of the Charter on the Public Policy Process and the Depart-
ment of Justice” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 597. 
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to protect policy distinctions amidst uncertainty about how the Court 
would interpret the equality protection in section 15.26 However, the 
notwithstanding clause soon became viewed as an unacceptable way to 
insulate legislation from the effects of a negative judicial decision,27 even 
for controversial decisions that fundamentally challenged the validity of 
government policy. A good example of this occurred after the Supreme 
Court ruled in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)28 that 
the way the government attempted to regulate tobacco advertising was 
not consistent with the Charter. Then Cabinet Minister David Dingwall 
recommended that the government respond to this ruling by invoking the 
notwithstanding clause, but this recommendation was rejected by 
cabinet, which instead approved revised legislation that was premised on 
less restrictive ways to accomplish the legislative goal that the govern-
ment believed could be defended as a reasonable limit under section 1.29 
Concerns about the costs of defending legislation and the practical 
and political interests in protecting legislative priorities from being 
derailed by judicial review have resulted in institutional procedures 
intended to insulate legislation from the effects of a negative judicial 
ruling. Regardless of which political party is in power, no government 
welcomes unforeseen obstacles to the pursuit of its legislative agenda. A 
                                                                                                             
26 This interpretation is drawn from a review of all uses of this power, as compiled by Tsvi 
Kahana, “The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public discussion: Lessons from the Ignored 
Practice of Section 33 of the Charter” (2001) 44:3 Canadian Public Administration 61. 
27 Extreme controversy followed upon Quebec’s decision to use the notwithstanding clause 
in response to the ruling in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) that set aside Quebec’s signs law for violating freedom of expression. What 
intensified this controversy was the context in which the notwithstanding clause was used. At the 
time, the Meech Lake Accord was subject to ratification by federal and provincial legislatures. A 
particularly controversial element of this Accord was the relationship between its proposed distinct 
society clause and the Charter. Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa invoked the notwithstanding clause 
to insulate new legislation from judicial review. The legislation differed significantly from the earlier 
law of the Parti Québécois that had been subject to the Charter challenge. Nevertheless, Premier 
Bourassa decided to invoke the notwithstanding clause to avoid uncertainty as to whether new 
legislation would survive the Charter. Adding to the controversy was a statement Bourassa made that 
suggested that use of the notwithstanding clause might not have been necessary had the Meech Lake 
Accord and distinct society clause been in place. This statement was interpreted by critics of the 
distinct society clause as confirming their fears that the clause would undermine protection for 
Charter rights, and also served to undermine the legitimacy of the notwithstanding clause. The 
political fallout was significant. Then Manitoba premier Gary Filmon abruptly withdrew his 
minority government’s support for the Meech Lake Accord, which required unanimous agreement to 
succeed. See Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1996), at 138-44. 
28 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 
S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.). 
29 Interviews, supra, note 16.  
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government that has successfully passed legislation will often be reluc-
tant to reopen the relevant issues, expend additional resources necessary 
to defend the measure politically, or manage internal divisions that could 
undermine caucus support, as may be required should legislation be 
struck down in whole or in part, or its meaning or effects altered signifi-
cantly through judicial interpretation. I refer to this concern as risk-
aversion. The attempt to anticipate judicial objections and incorporate 
judicial norms into legislative decision-making is not unique to Canada. 
The United Kingdom similarly engages in risk assessments of proposed 
legislation in terms of compatibility with the European Convention on 
Human Rights,30 and institutional actors in France, Germany and Spain 
also engage in pre-legislative review for similar risk-averse motives.31 
As discussed above, the principal institutional mechanism for man-
aging risk in Canada has been a change to the Memorandum to cabinet to 
require an assessment of the risk of a successful Charter challenge in the 
courts, the anticipated impact of negative decisions, and possible 
litigation costs.32 When assessing proposed legislation, Charter consis-
tency is interpreted by government lawyers on the basis of conformity 
with relevant case law, and assessments are framed in the language of 
risk: the likelihood that courts will declare that legislation inconsistent 
with protected rights, in the event of litigation. The political criterion for 
whether a report on inconsistency with the Charter is required is whether 
a credible Charter argument can be made in defence of the legislation.33 
Not surprisingly, the manner in which the Court has interpreted the 
Charter and, in particular, its approach to section 1, have significantly 
influenced pre-legislative Charter evaluations by government officials. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a two-stage approach to the 
Charter that distinguishes the question of whether a right has been 
infringed from the assessment of the validity of the legislation, has led to 
a broader interpretation of rights than would have occurred had the Court 
adopted definitional limits, thus increasing the likelihood of and fre-
quency with which legislation was vulnerable for constituting a prima 
                                                                                                             
30 Janet L. Hiebert, “Governing under the Human Rights Act: The Limitations of Wishful 
Thinking” (January 2012) Public Law, at 34-36. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223. 
31 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 2000). 
32 Government of Canada Privy Council Office, Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regula-
tions, 2d edition, ch. 2.2, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/legislation/
pdf-eng.pdf>. 
33 Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra, note 19, at 7-13. 
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facie rights infringement. As a result, Canadian governments have to 
defend legislation more often than in jurisdictions where rights are 
interpreted more narrowly. 
A second reason that this judicial approach has influenced bureau-
cratic assessments of compatibility is that the regularity of section 1 
justifications has established a readily understood context for anticipating 
the kinds of questions and criteria asked by the Court when legislation is 
litigated. The invocation of consistently cited criteria for evaluating 
impugned legislation allows policy officials and legal advisors to predict, 
with a fair degree of confidence, not only when legislation will be found 
to implicate the Charter, but also what kinds of questions the courts will 
ask when deciding if legislation constitutes a justifiable restriction on a 
protected right. Thus, pre-legislative review focuses heavily on whether 
legislative initiatives are likely to satisfy judicial interpretations of 
proportionality, and has involved government lawyers in a regular role of 
advising relevant departments to seek alternative means to accomplish a 
legislative goal.34 As James Kelly argues, the Charter has helped trans-
form the Department of Justice’s role from providing merely “a technical 
review of legislation to a substantive role in the development of new 
policy”,35 so much so that the Department of Justice has assumed the 
importance of a central agency within the machinery of government.36 
Many provincial governments, particularly in the larger provinces, have 
adopted procedures that similarly give emphasis to the identification 
of possible Charter problems, with the purpose of reducing the risk of 
constitutional invalidation.37 
A third reason the Court’s approach to section 1 has influenced bu-
reaucratic and political Charter assessments is the significant breadth for 
justifying legislative objectives that nevertheless were found to violate 
Charter-protected rights. The Court’s reluctance to veto legislation in the 
first part of the section 1 inquiry has signalled to politicians the political 
opportunity to try to advance a wide range of policy objectives. In rare 
cases, anticipation of Charter vulnerability has resulted in developing 
                                                                                                             
34 Interviews, supra, note 16. 
35 James B. Kelly, “Legislative Activism and Parliamentary Bills of Rights” [hereinafter 
“Kelly, ‘Legislative Activism’”] in James B. Kelly & Christopher P. Manfredi, Contested 
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2009), at 93. 
36 Id., at 89. 
37 Kelly, Governing with the Charter, supra, note 19, at 214; Andrew Petter, “Legalize 
This: The Chartering of Canadian Politics” in Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The 
Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 211. 
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litigation strategies when legislation is actually being developed or assessed 
by Parliament, including uses of legislative preambles and committee 
hearing processes to explain Parliament’s “Charter judgment”.38  
V. RISK TAKING 
Despite serious apprehension of the costs associated with successful 
Charter litigation, risk aversion is not the only strategy a government 
invokes under the Charter. Depending on the legislative objective or the 
political context in which it arises, risk aversion may give way to risk 
taking, where government knowingly introduces a bill that has a high 
degree of risk for litigation and invalidation. 
Legal advice on Charter consistency is not binding, and therefore 
does not automatically lead to amendments to bills to address perceived 
concerns of Charter inconsistency. Instead, this advice leads to political 
judgment about whether and how to interpret it in the context of the 
government’s legislative agenda, specifically, whether amendments are 
required to allow the minister to claim the bill is compatible for purposes 
of the cabinet memorandum, or whether the Minister of Justice is 
prepared to exercise his or her own professional judgment as a lawyer 
and disagree with the advice provided by legal advisors in the Depart-
ment of Justice. 
These political judgments reflect broad discretion for the following 
reasons: 
 the difficulty of predicting the implications of earlier Charter cases 
for new issues; 
 political and ideological perspectives that invite differences on how 
the Charter implicates the role of the state, or what responsibility 
government has to pursue perceived social problems or address sub-
stantive inequality in power or resources, thus affecting assessments 
of Charter compatibility; 
 strategic calculations about whether to reduce Charter problems or 
gamble on whether failure or minimal responses to address these 
                                                                                                             
38 Good examples of this occurred in the following legislative disagreements with judicial 
rulings about the rules of evidence in sexual assault trials: Bill C-49, following R. v. Seaboyer, 
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”]; Bill C-72, following R. 
v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”]; and Bill 
C-46, following R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“O’Connor”]. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra, note 19, at 91-117. 
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will result in litigation, which involve consideration of the resources 
required to mobilize policy communities and political allies to 
revisit a legislative goal should it be declared unconstitutional, 
whether the immediate political gains of passing legislation exceed 
the anticipated costs if it is later declared unconstitutional, the time 
a government may have before a bill is declared invalid, and the 
political benefits of being able to blame the Court for preventing 
government from pursuing a particular objective it claims to be in 
the public interest. 
Under current conditions, it is virtually impossible to know the na-
ture of the legal advice rendered or how and why government has 
responded to this advice in the manner it has. The confidential nature of 
the advice provided to ministers is strictly protected (despite the fact that 
legal advice is published in New Zealand)39 and this, along with cabinet 
solidarity, makes it virtually impossible to know whether, why or how 
often the government ignores or challenges the advice it receives. 
Compounding this uncertainty is the political environment in which 
legal advisors work, which has resulted in an extreme reluctance of 
government officials, particularly under the Harper government, to give 
interviews on how Charter evaluations are assessed, even under strong 
assurances of anonymity.40 
Concern that judgment on Charter compatibility is influenced by 
political and partisan considerations has led James Kelly and Matthew 
Hennigar to argue that the functions of the Attorney General and the 
Minister of Justice should be separated for Charter reporting purposes, 
with responsibility for assessing Charter compatibility given to the 
Attorney General.41 While others have called for greater independence of 
                                                                                                             
39 Department of Justice, New Zealand, “Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act”, 
online: <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-and-human-rights/human-rights/domestic-
human-rights-protection/about-the-new-zealand-bill-of-rights-act/advising-the-attorney-general>. 
40 Although government lawyers in the Department of Justice have been unwilling to give 
formal interviews, informal conversations have suggested that the Harper administration is willing to 
pursue legislation despite a high degree of identified risk. This impression is supported by Globe and 
Mail reporter Kirk Makin, who on the basis of anonymous interviews with senior members of the 
Department of Justice, reports that “legislation has been pushed through despite stern internal 
warnings that it would likely violate Charter provisions”. Kirk Makin, “Canadian Crime and 
American Punishment” The Globe and Mail (Quebec ed.) (November 27, 2009), at F7. 
41 James B. Kelly & Matthew A. Hennigar, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and the Minis-
ter of Justice: Weak-form Review within a Constitutional Charter of Rights” (2012) 10:1 I-Con 35 
[hereinafter “Kelly & Hennigar”]. 
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the Minister of Justice when performing the reporting function,42 Kelly 
and Hennigar argue that the portfolios of the Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General should be treated as formally distinct. Whereas the 
Minister of Justice would function within government as the parliamen-
tarian who is responsible for advocating legal policy, under their scena-
rio, the separate office of the Attorney General would be responsible for 
litigating on behalf of the government and providing legal advice that is 
based on assessing the constitutionality of the government’s agenda. 
They argue that the problem with the fusion of these offices, even if 
one argues for more independence from partisan and governmental 
influences, is that the Minister of Justice cannot act independently from 
cabinet. Thus, they call for the Attorney General to be accessible to 
cabinet deliberations, but not necessarily to be a full voting member of 
the cabinet. This change, they argue, would ensure greater independence 
from cabinet solidarity, as is the practice in some other Westminster-
based parliamentary systems.43 In the United Kingdom, the reporting on 
consistency with rights is not centralized in the office of the Attorney 
General but instead is made by individual ministers. However, the 
ultimate government authority on these matters is the Attorney General, 
who is a member of the ministry but, by convention, is independent of 
cabinet. In New Zealand, the Attorney General has responsibility for 
legal advice about compatibility and is a member of cabinet but, by 
convention, is not bound by cabinet solidarity on questions of the law.44 
VI. LACK OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY 
If lack of transparency is a problem for legal academics who study 
how Charter considerations influence political behaviour, it has even 
more troubling implications for Parliament. Whether a government 
invokes a rights-aversion or a risk-taking strategy, Parliament is gener-
ally unaware of the level of risk that legislation could be invalidated or 
the government’s assumptions about why it assumes that the risk is worth 
                                                                                                             
42 John Ll. J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 
1964); John Ll. J. Edwards, Ministerial Responsibility for National Security as it Relates to the 
Offices of Prime Minister, Attorney General and Solicitor General of Canada (Study published for 
the McDonald Commission of Inquiry) (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980); Ian Scott, 
“Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constance and Change in the 1980s” (1989) 39 
U.T.L.J. 109; Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender 
of the Rule of Law (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 601. 
43 Kelly & Hennigar, supra, note 41, at 51-64. 
44 Id., at 50. 
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taking. Parliament has become even more marginalized in terms of its 
influence on government than before the Charter was adopted. This is a 
result of the increasingly centralized nature of how power is exercised 
(which has occurred independent of but overlapping the time frame of 
the Charter), which Donald Savoie characterizes as governing at the 
centre,45 and also because advice on Charter consistency is centralized in 
the Department of Justice and this information is confidential to govern-
ment and not accessible to Parliament. 
James Kelly discusses the institutional imbalance between relevant 
information and engagement with questions of Charter consistency that 
arises between the Cabinet and Parliament. Kelly argues that this 
imbalance contributed to the decline of Parliament as a legislative-
making body because it has undermined political and constitutional 
scrutiny of the cabinet’s legislative agenda.46 Notwithstanding rare 
occasions where Parliament addressed the Charter implications of 
contentious legislative bills (such as the government’s legislative 
response to the Seaboyer, Daviault and O’Connor rulings,47 and anti-
terrorist measures in the wake of anti-terrorist legislation),48 as a general 
matter, Parliament is seldom a focus for deliberation about whether bills 
are consistent with the Charter or should be amended to redress consis-
tency problems. 
This lack of parliamentary Charter engagement occurs despite the 
fact that the Canadian Parliament has a committee in each house that 
evaluates constitutional and legal dimensions of bills. These are the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights 
and the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. 
These committees often hear from witnesses who present a range of 
opinions on Charter and other relevant issues. Yet committee members 
have indicated they lack adequate time and information to make in-
formed judgments about the extent and nature of Charter concerns.49 
Moreover, their lack of independent legal advice on the Charter can make 
it difficult to know how to assess the significance of committee testi-
mony by individuals or groups who allege a serious Charter breach, 
particularly when the Minister of Justice has not reported a compatibility 
                                                                                                             
45 Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian 
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
46 Kelly, “Legislative Activism”, supra, note 35, at 94. 
47 Supra, note 38; Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra, note 19, at 91-117. 
48 Kelly, “Legislative Activism”, supra, note 35, at 93. 
49 Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra, note 19, at 16, 157-59. 
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problem. The absence of any ministerial report on Charter inconsistency 
has dissuaded Parliament from participating in judgment about compati-
bility, either because of the possible mistaken assumption that the 
absence of a report should be construed as confirmation that serious 
Charter problems do not exist or, more likely, because neither govern-
ment nor Parliament conceives of Parliament as a significant forum for 
debates about Charter consistency. As a consequence, Parliament is 
entirely unaware of the nature of the legal advice on Charter consistency 
rendered, whether or how often a government ignores or disagrees with 
its legal advisors’ evaluations of Charter compatibility, or the likelihood 
that legislation could be subject to judicial invalidation if subsequently 
litigated. This lack of parliamentary awareness for how legislation 
implicates the Charter raises the serious concern that Parliament will 
regularly pass legislation without knowing whether the legislation has 
significant Charter problems. 
VII. REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF LEGISLATIVE RIGHTS  
REVIEW IN CANADA 
Canada would benefit from revisiting the reasons and benefits of 
legislative rights review, and considering reforms to facilitate Parlia-
ment’s capacity and knowledge to make reasoned judgments about 
whether legislation is justifiable under the Charter. 
Skeptics might question this claim to revisit the role of legislative 
rights review under the Charter on two accounts. First, they might query 
why legislative rights review is even necessary under a constitutional bill 
of rights that authorizes strong judicial remedial powers, and second, 
they might question whether Parliament has the institutional capacity or 
temperament to engage in judgments about rights. It is easier to respond 
to this first skeptical query than the latter (but as argued later, four 
reforms to current procedures would help revitalize Parliament’s institu-
tional capacity to call on government to defend and explain assumptions 
about why legislative initiatives are justified from a Charter perspective). 
In responding to skepticism about relevance, the following three reasons 
justify revisiting the concept of legislative rights review under the 
Charter. 
First, parliamentary engagement with how the Charter should guide 
or constrain legislation would help reconcile democratic concerns with 
respect for rights. Parliamentary scrutiny of the merits of legislative objec-
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tives and their means would better enable Parliament to achieve its 
legislative intentions in a constitutionally viable manner, than if Parliament 
were compelled to revise legislation within judicially defined parameters 
after a negative judicial finding, in what many Charter scholars currently 
characterize as the “dialogue” phase of inter-institutional disagreements.50 
If government is not pressured to explain its assumptions about whether 
and how legislative bills are justified in light of their Charter implica-
tions, Parliament could be in danger of unknowingly passing legislation 
that is either overly risky in terms of its potential for successful Charter 
litigation or, alternatively, overly risk averse and thus less ambitious or 
effective than otherwise necessary. Either way, the idea that Parliament is 
required to vote on legislation despite being uncertain about the Charter 
implications undermines the idea that legislation should be guided by the 
normative values reflected in the Charter. Not only would parliamen-
tary Charter scrutiny more likely result in legislation that reflects more 
reasoned judgment about whether legislation is justified in light of its 
adverse implications for protected rights than current practices that rely 
on government checking itself, but Charter scrutiny, or the lack of it, 
would also be useful for external assessments by judges when assessing 
the justification of legislation. 
Second, legislative rights review has the potential to rebalance power 
between Parliament and the executive. The popularity of the Charter has 
made it difficult for politicians to openly criticize the Charter or argue 
that Charter values should be ignored if these constrain a legislative 
objective that the government strongly supports. If a process of parlia-
mentary Charter scrutiny were institutionalized, this would help create an 
expectation that government should explain assumptions about why bills 
are warranted and justified in light of their consistency with the Charter. 
This scrutiny would also make it more difficult for government to act as 
if it has a political monopoly on Charter judgment, as it currently does by 
default because of Parliament’s lack of engagement, and would also 
expose the contested nature of government claims of compatibility. 
Finally, incorporating legislative rights review would offer more 
comprehensive rights protection than relying so heavily on judicial 
review and judicial remedies, and thus would address a serious concern 
that has long plagued more conventional bills of rights. The concern is 
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that judicially imposed remedies can only provide partial protection 
against rights infringements because the majority of legislation passed 
will not be litigated and therefore will not be subject to judicial review. 
Thus, if Parliament were to pass rights-offending legislation regularly, 
whether by intention or by neglect, only a small portion of these rights-
offending decisions would ever be corrected through judicially imposed 
remedies. As Brian Slattery argues in challenging the idea that judicial 
review is a sufficient remedy for a lack of political engagement with the 
Charter: 
Courts have only a limited capacity to assess the correctness of 
governmental decisions on crucial aspects of public policy and so 
(quite properly in many instances) may feel constrained to defer to the 
wisdom of the government on these points. It follows that for a 
government to adopt the attitude of “pass now, justify in court later” 
would not only be an abdication of its Charter responsibilities, but in 
fact would undermine the foundation s of judicial respect for the 
decisions of coordinate branches of government.51 
VIII. REFORM CONSIDERATIONS TO STRENGTHEN  
PARLIAMENTARY CHARTER SCRUTINY 
This paper concludes by suggesting four reforms to current practices 
that would help facilitate Parliament’s capacity to engage in Charter 
scrutiny. Three of these are influenced by the United Kingdom’s imple-
mentation of legislative rights review. 
The first reform would be to alter the nature of the statutory report-
ing obligation to include a statement on the compatibility status for all 
government bills. The United Kingdom approach requires either a report 
on whether bills are compatible with protected rights (which is the 
category in which the overwhelming majority of bills fit) or, where this is 
not possible, a report that the minister is unable to claim that the bill is 
compatible.52 
                                                                                                             
51 Brian Slattery, “A Theory of the Charter” (1987) 25:4 Osgoode Hall L.J. 714. 
52 The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 requires ministerial 
reports of compatibility. The specific requirement is in s. 19 and is as follows: 
(1) A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, 
before Second Reading of the Bill —  
(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compat-
ible with the Convention rights (“a statement of compatibility”); or  
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Broadening the reporting obligation in Canada is not likely to result 
in reports of an inability to claim compatibility, for the same reasons the 
Minister of Justice is not currently willing to acknowledge that bills are 
inconsistent with the Charter. Nevertheless, a statutory requirement to 
address the compatibility of all bills would help focus Parliament’s 
attention on the fact that Charter compatibility should be a consideration 
in parliamentary debate and that political judgment about compatibility is 
often contested.53 
A second reform Canada should consider is also influenced by the 
United Kingdom, where the responsibility for ministerial reports on 
compatibility is adapted for a bicameral system, and therefore requires a 
report to be made in both houses. This would ensure that Charter con-
cerns do not arise because of amendments proposed after the initial 
report was made. 
The third consideration is derived from the persuasive arguments by 
Kelly and Hennigar to help reduce the risk of partisan influence from 
legislative assessments of Charter compatibility, by separating the 
responsibility for providing legal advice from political responsibility to 
develop the government’s legal policy. Thus, the functions of the Attor-
ney General and Minister of Justice would be formally distinguished, and 
Charter assessments and reports to Parliament would be conducted by the 
Attorney General, rather than by the Minister of Justice. 
Finally, Canada should follow the United Kingdom’s lead by estab-
lishing a specialized joint committee to assess questions of rights.54 The 
Joint Committee of Human Rights (“JCHR”) in the United Kingdom 
has earned a strong reputation for the robust scrutiny it provides. The 
Committee, assisted by a highly respected human rights lawyer, exam-
ines all bills and focuses particular attention on those that raise questions 
of compatibility with protected rights. The committee assesses ministe-
rial claims of compatibility, analyzes the implications of bills for pro-
tected rights, writes to departments and ministers with queries and 
follows up on responses, conducts hearings to elicit evidence where 
concerns arise about whether government claims about the importance or 
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nature of the perceived problem warrant the measures proposed by 
government, and reports its recommendations and concerns to Parliament 
while a bill is still being debated in at least one house of Parliament.55 
Policy officials and legal advisors interviewed suggest three ways in 
which JCHR reports influence legislation. First, departments and ministers 
try to avoid being subject to a critical report and thus where possible will 
anticipate JCHR concerns to avoid this prospect. Second, public officials 
acknowledge that on occasion the JCHR draws attention to issues that 
were overlooked in the pre-introduction evaluation of bills. Third, the 
JCHR’s persistent criticism of the lack of reasons or explanations for 
ministerial claims of compatibility has increased pressure on departments 
to provide more substantive explanations to support the claim about why 
a bill is compatible with protected rights. 
Research suggests at least one other way of influencing government: 
pressure to increase safeguards necessary for ensuring that policies are 
implemented in a compatible manner. Disagreements with the JCHR on 
compatibility have arisen because departmental compatibility assess-
ments are based on the actual provisions of the legislation, whereas the 
JCHR pays more attention to problems that could arise from insufficient 
safeguards to ensure policies are interpreted and applied in a rights-
compatible manner.56 
This idea for a joint parliamentary Charter committee is not an obvi-
ous panacea for the current lack of reasoned or robust parliamentary 
engagement with the Charter. Canadian parliamentary proceedings are 
heavily conditioned by several factors that constrain Parliament’s 
influence on government. The most significant constraint is stronger 
party discipline that far exceeds what occurs in the United Kingdom. The 
smaller size of the Canadian Parliament makes it easier for government 
to control its caucus, and backbench members rarely revolt or vote 
against a government bill because their desire to remain on good terms 
with the leader dissuades them from having a more robust conception of 
their role as parliamentarians. A second serious constraint is the concen-
tration of power in the office of party leaders, which far exceeds the 
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power of party leaders in other Westminster parliamentary systems. 
Members can be pressured to support party positions in the lower house 
because of unparalleled Canadian powers to oust members from caucus 
for failing to support the government, and even to refuse to sign their 
nomination papers for future elections. 
However, the effort to facilitate a rights-oriented debate in the Cana-
dian House of Commons has one important advantage that the United 
Kingdom lacks: the popularity of the Charter is in sharp contrast to high 
levels of political and public skepticism about the Human Rights Act in 
the United Kingdom. If the question of Charter compatibility became a 
more substantial part of assessing the merits of the government’s legisla-
tive agenda, this would almost certainly strengthen the capacity of the 
House of Commons to place pressure on government to justify and 
explain its assumptions about why bills are compatible with protected 
rights, increase pressure on government to consider amendments to redress 
perceived Charter problems and, where the issue of consistency was 
contested, to explain why the government believes the bill is nevertheless 
meritorious. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Legislative rights review has become a core element in recently 
introduced parliamentary bills of rights. Whether as compensation for 
constraints on the scope of judicial remedial power or a sincere belief 
that a bill of rights is better conceived as encouraging proactive attempts 
to avoid rights violations, bills of rights introduced after the adoption of 
the Charter have embodied attempts to reduce the likelihood that Parlia-
ment passes legislation without awareness of the implications for rights. 
Yet this idea is worthwhile, independent of the form a bill of rights takes, 
because legislative rights review addresses a fundamental challenge that 
all bills of rights incur: will rights protection be undermined by Parlia-
ment’s failure to engage in judgment about how rights appropriately 
guide or constrain legislative decisions? Thus, whether a bill of rights 
authorizes strong-form or weak-form judicial review, a bill of rights can 
only provide minimal or partial protection if courts are the sole institu-
tional venue for assessing the merits or legitimacy of legislation from a 
rights perspective. 
Canada would benefit from placing more emphasis on Parliament’s 
responsibility to scrutinize legislation in terms of justification and 
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consistency with the Charter. However, the possibility of integrating 
Charter consideration more fully into legislative deliberations is not a 
realistic option as long as Parliament defers to government for judgment 
about compatibility and continues to absolve government of responsibil-
ity to explain its reasons for assuming that bills are consistent with or 
justified under the Charter. 
This paper has identified several reforms that would help improve 
Parliament’s capacity to assess bills in terms of their implications for the 
Charter. In the absence of reforms to require government to explain and 
account for bills that implicate rights adversely, Parliament remains in 
the untenable position of passing legislation for which it does not fully 
understand the Charter implications. The fact that only a small fraction of 
the legislation passed will ever be subject to Charter litigation suggests 
that current Canadian practices can provide only limited assurances that 
Charter values appropriately guide and constrain Canadian laws. 
Although the focus of this paper is on Parliament’s role under the 
Charter, it is interesting to speculate whether parliamentary deliberations 
about Charter justification would (or should) influence judicial rulings. A 
decision about whether or how courts should be guided by the quality of 
parliamentary deliberations is ultimately a judicial prerogative. Yet, it 
seems fair to suggest that reasoned parliamentary deliberation is more 
likely to produce reasonable legislation than when such deliberation is 
absent, and that the reasonableness of the legislation will also be more 
apparent. It also seems appropriate to suggest that where contentious 
legislation is passed that raises serious questions of Charter consistency, 
and parliamentary deliberations seem opaque or non-responsive to 
Charter concerns, judges might reasonably ask themselves why judicial 
deference is warranted, particularly when judges have a reasonable 
basis to be apprehensive that a regular or predictable pattern of judicial 
deference will undermine the political incentives for government to take 
Charter considerations seriously. 
  
